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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The causes of price anomalies in financial markets remain a puzzle. Empirical 
studies typically fall into two broad categories. First, those studies that examine 
the price reaction to identifiable corporate announcements such as profit 
warnings or earnings. Second, other studies analyze prices following periods of 
extreme price performance. The abnormal returns documented by a number of 
studies in these two categories pose a challenge to the efficient markets theory 
which posits that prices respond to unanticipated economic events or news in 
such a way that expected arbitrage profits are zero.  
One of the principal problems in testing for price anomalies is the need for a 
pricing model that provides an appropriate risk-adjusted benchmark. Thus, 
while a number of studies report price overreaction, the results critically rest on 
the assumption of a correct pricing model. Without the latter, there can be no 
unambiguous consensus as to whether overreaction occurs.    
Closed-end funds provide an ideal laboratory to test for abnormal price 
behaviour. Data on individual fund prices and the value of the assets held by the 
individual funds (the Net Asset Value) are available daily for funds quoted on 
the London market. The NAV therefore provides a benchmark and so does away 
with the need to specify an asset-pricing model. We use the term ‘anomalous 
fund-price behaviour’ to signify excess fund-price changes relative to 
contemporaneous changes in the NAV. Thus, in instances where the fund price 
(P) falls, in relative terms, more than the corresponding fall in the NAV, the fund 
discount will widen (the premium will decline). 1   
This paper contributes to the literature in two respects: first, in investigating 
the short-term behaviour of the closed-end-fund discount at the time of market-
wide shocks and second, in investigating the role of fund size (as a proxy for 
liquidity) and ease of arbitrage in explaining the pattern of post-shock prices. 
Although a number of studies (Thompson, 1978; Anderson, 1986; Pontiff, 1995) 
investigate the longer-term time series of the discount, no study, apart from 
                                                  










Burch et al. (2003), examines the short-term behaviour of the discount during 
periods of market stress. Second, although Gemmill and Thomas (2002) provide 
evidence about the role of costly arbitrage in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in average discounts and Pontiff (1996) provides evidence both on the 
cross-sectional variation and the impact of interest rates of the discount, no study 
has yet examined the relationship between the speed of short-term discount 
reversion and the ease of arbitrage.   
Our findings indicate that fund prices overreact with respect to the NAV; the 
discount widens (narrows) on the day of the negative (positive) shock. In the 
subsequent post-shock period, the results are mixed. There is weak evidence that, 
in the case of negative shocks, the discount, following an initial widening on the 
day of the shock, tends to revert to pre-shock levels. A similar, but opposite, 
pattern is observed for positive shocks. 
When funds are categorised by characteristic, we find that the discount for 
small funds widens following negative shocks but takes longer than large funds 
to return towards pre-shock levels. Following negative shocks, the discount of 
difficult-to-arbitrage funds widens but shows little inclination to revert. When 
difficult-to-arbitrage funds are filtered out from the small-fund group, the 
reversion in the discount occurs more rapidly. This finding suggests that, for 
small funds, the ease of arbitrage is a key factor in explaining the speed in the 
reversion of the discount. By contrast, the time profile of the post-shock reaction 
for the large-fund group is robust to the exclusion of easy-to-arbitrage funds.  
Tests for differences in the average discount over longer pre-shock [-60,-11] 
and post-shock [+11,+60] windows suggest that, following negative (positive) 
shocks, the discount settles at a level that is wider (narrower) than its pre-shock 
average. Ease of arbitrage again appears to be the key factor driving the speed of 
reversion in the discount. There are also asymmetries in the effect of negative and 
positive shocks. For instance, for negative shocks the discount widens 
significantly for difficult-to-arbitrage funds whereas it remains unchanged (or 
marginally narrows) for easy-to-arbitrage funds. By contrast, for positive shocks 










unchanged for difficult-to-arbitrage funds. This may be driven by the type of 
investor holding these funds. Retail investors, who are the predominant holders 
of easy-to-arbitrage funds, appear to overreact to positive shocks while 
institutional investors, who hold difficult-to-arbitrage funds, overreact to 
negative shocks.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
overreaction. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the methodology. Section 
4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 examines the robustness of the 
results. A final section concludes. 
 
2   BACKGROUND LITERATURE  
 
Studies examining daily price performance in the aftermath of a shock, typically 
document a price pattern that suggests overreaction. After negative shocks, 
prices fall initially and then rebound (Atkins and Dyl, 1990; Bremer and 
Sweeney, 1991). Park (1995), however, argues that these results might be fragile; 
overreaction disappears when mid-prices are used. In contrast, Melnik et al. 
(2003) report evidence of momentum using market indices. Markets continue to 
fall in the days immediately after large market-wide negative shocks and vice 
versa. Although allowance is taken of factors such as systematic risk and size, the 
problem of a valid benchmark against which to calibrate excess price-reaction 
remains. 
Two features of the closed-end fund literature are relevant to this study. First, 
the response of fund prices to changes in the net asset value. Pontiff (1997) finds 
that while fund prices are more volatile that the price of the assets, fund prices 
tend to underreact to changes in the NAV. A similar finding is reported by 
Hardouvelis et al. (1994) who find prices of country funds to be sticky in response 
to changes in the NAV. This underreaction is, however, conditioned by the 
salience of the information in the NAV figure. The fund-price reaction to changes 
in NAV is less sticky in periods where salient news is reported (Klibanoff et al., 
1998). Second, the role of arbitrage in limiting the level of the discount. Pontiff 










discount. His results suggest that both smaller funds (which have higher 
transactions costs, higher bid-ask spreads and subject to greater market impact 
costs) and funds that are more difficult to arbitrage should sell at wider levels of 
discount. The findings of Datar (2001) provide supporting evidence that those 
funds that are more liquid (proxied by, amongst other variables, fund size) trade 
at smaller discounts. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) confirm the role of arbitrage in 
defining boundaries for the discount and the discount at which the fund sells. 
Fund managers who manage funds that are difficult to arbitrage charge higher 
management expenses and this leads to wider levels of discount. They also find 
that smaller funds sell, on average, at wider discounts.  
Burch et al. (2003) investigate the relation between the events of ‘Nine-Eleven’ 
and the average discount on a sample of US-traded equity and bond closed-end 
funds. They find that discounts widen from 3.3% on the Friday before 11 
September (7th September) to 7.7% on the first trading Friday post-9/11 (21st  
September). In the 15 trading days immediately following 17th September, 
however, they note the close relation between the movement of the mean daily 
discounts and the relative movements of the S&P 500. This co-movement is 
attributed to investor sentiment and to investors looking to the broader market 
movements for guidance. This assertion is tested below. 
 
3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 The sample of funds and alternative groupings 
 
The sample of funds that we use to track through the 8 shocks comprises 63 
closed-end funds traded continuously on the London Stock Exchange during the 
period from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 2003.2 Daily fund-price and NAV 
data on each of the funds over the 8 non-overlapping event windows [-60, +60] 
around each shock are gathered from Datastream. 
                                                  
2This dataset avoids the potential price effects associated both with newly floated funds and with 
funds being wound up. The former usually sell initially at a premium and subsequently record 
negative price-returns to trade at the usual discount. Funds in the process of winding up typically 











Let  it P  denote the closing price of the ith fund on trading day t. The daily fund 
return in percentage points is calculated as: 
RP P P  i= , ,..., ,  t=- ,- ,..., it it i t =× − 100 12 63 59 58 60 1 log( / ), ,       
and likewise for the NAV return ( it RN ). The abnormal returns is defined as:  
it it it RN RP AR − =  
 
for i=1,2,…,63 funds and t=-59,-58,…,60 days. We also construct two sub-samples 
of funds based on size and ease of arbitrage considerations. To classify by size, we 
rank the funds by their average NAV in 1992, 1998 and 2002 from the Credit 
Lyonnais Year Books. There is a high degree of correspondence in the ranking 
across these years. We use £200m and £500m as threshold market values for 
‘small’ and ‘large’ funds. Funds with a market value below £200m are classified 
as small (N=21) and those above £500m as large (N=18). The average market 
value for ‘small’ and ‘large’ funds in 1998 is £77m and £1015m, respectively. 
In order to categorize the funds by ease of arbitrage, we first label them as UK, 
US, or Far East on the basis of their investment mandates. Next, we regress the 
NAV returns (measured weekly over 1989:01-2002:12) of each fund against the 
FTSE 100, S&P 500, and Nikkei 300 returns, respectively. The regression Ri2 
statistic for the ith fund, i=1,2,...,63, provides a measure of the ease of replication. 
For instance, a large Ri2=0.95 would suggest that arbitrage for the ith fund is 
feasible when it is selling at a large discount by buying the fund and selling the 
index which proxies the underlying assets. For such a fund it would be expected 
that any mispricing would be arbitraged away relatively quickly. We rank the 
funds in ascending order according to their Ri2 and define the top and bottom 
quartiles with N=16 funds each as easy-to-arbitrage (EA hereafter) and difficult-
to-arbitrage (DA) funds, respectively. The average Ri2 for the EA and DA funds is 
0.88 and 0.12, respectively. 
 
3.2  Market-wide shocks 
 
This study investigates the behavior of closed-end fund prices following 










as follows.  A ‘large shock’ is deemed to occur when (i) the FTSE All Share Index 
moves more than ±3% on any single day t over the period 24th July 1989 to 21st 
April 2003 and (ii) there is no other comparable daily return in a [t-60,  t-1] 
window. We exclude the trading period over the Millennium where, although 
the Index recorded a drop of about -3.11% on 4th January 2000, UK markets had 
previously been closed for an extended trading period. Six negative shocks and 
two positive shocks are identified during the sample period. The former include 
the events of 9/11 (shock #5). 3 
Table 1 reports the (absolute) daily return on the Index at the identified event 
date, Rt, and its average over pre-event windows of 60-, 10- and 5-days length. 
We also calculate a standardized return measure, Rt/SDt where SDt denotes the 
moving standard deviation of daily returns over the [t-60, t-1] window. 
[Table 1 around here] 
The average change in the Index on day 0 across the six negative shocks is -3.75% 
with a maximum of -5.21% on 9/11. The average Index daily return on day 0 for 
the two positive shocks is 4.51%.  
The Rt/SDt ratio at day 0 confirms that, once we account for market conditions 
(volatility of returns) in the pre-shock period, the shocks identified still represent 
large price movements. The average R0/SD0 o v e r  t h e  s i x  n e g a t i v e  s h o c k s  i s  -
4.49%, with a minimum and maximum of -6.34% and -2.80%, respectively. The 
average R0/SD0 over the two positive shocks is 6.11%. 
 
3.3   Methodology 
 
We construct cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measures from day 0 to 
investigate anomalies in fund prices and test whether they are statistically 
                                                  
3 Of the negative jumps, shocks #1 and #3 represent ‘UK gloom’ (increased perceived risk of a UK 
recession) whereas shock #2 responds to political event in Russia, shock #4 may be linked to mixed 
news about the UK and shock #6 represents an accounting irregularity.  As for the positive jumps, 
shock #1 may be the response to an announcement regarding entry to the ERM and shock #2 
represents the reaction to the UK government election. Thus negative shocks #1, #3 and #5 might 











significant. We consider 20 post-event days for the tests and construct the 
following statistics:  
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is it i it t  
The test statistic is a t-ratio for a hypothesis concerning the mean of a 
distribution: 










where  () t se CAR  is the square root of the sample estimate of  () t Var CAR . We 
conduct tests of the null hypothesis H0: 0 = µ  against H1: 0 ≠ µ . The null 
distribution of Zt is asymptotically a standard normal or exactly a Student t with 
N-1 degrees of freedom if the sample population of CARs is normal. 
Typically, inference in event studies utilizes the cross-section of abnormal 
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where  σtb i t Var CAR , ()
2 ≡  is the dispersion of the cross-section distribution of 
fund CARs or ‘between-fund’ variation at t. Usually Var CARit () is estimated by 
substituting the sample variance  
s
N
CAR CAR t tb i t t
i
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= ∑    
for σib ,
2 . This estimator assumes that the event windows of the N securities do not 
overlap so that the covariance terms are set to zero. Thus it implicitly assumes 
that the CARs are independent in the cross-section. Our market-wide event 
definition implies clustering and so it is important to account for across-fund 
dependence in measuring  () t Var CAR . In the present context (average positive 
dependence), the resulting standard error from (1) will underestimate the true 
standard error and the t-tests will therefore suffer from a large probability of 










misleading evidence on overreaction. This paper adopts a time-series portfolio 
approach to circumvent this problem.4 
Interpreting t AR  as the abnormal return of an equally-weighted portfolio of 
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σ                        (2) 
whereσiw i t Var AR , ()
2 ≡  is the dispersion of the time-series distribution of fund i 
abnormal returns (or ‘within-fund’ variation) and σw
2  is its average over the 
funds;  σ  is analogously defined for the covariance parameter 
















The parameter σiw ,




















== ∑∑  ,                  (3) 
over the (-60,-11] estimation window (i.e., T=49) and analogously forσij. On the 
other hand  CAR AR AR AR
t t =+ + + 01 ...  and so it follows that 
Var CAR t Var CAR t () ( ) () =+ 1 0  for t=0,1,…,20, where Var CAR Var AR ()( ) 00 = can 
be estimated using (2) and (3). 
This approach is equivalent to directly using the time series variation of 























                      (3) 
where T signifies the estimation window (-60,-11]. This procedure is advocated 
by Brown and Warner (1985) for tackling clustering effects.5 Using (2) instead of 
                                                  
4 The variance estimator (1) is inconsistent under clustering (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997; 
Ch.4). 










(3) has the additional advantage that it facilitates estimates of the average within-
fund variation (σw
2 ) and co-variation (σ ) across all funds and over different 
fund groups to draw comparisons. 
 
4   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1   Summary statistics over pre-shock window 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics over the (-60, -11) estimation window. Panel 
A refers to all 63 funds while the other panels relate to the alternative groupings.  
[Table 2 around here] 
We report the average abnormal return  AR  and the average discount D. Also 
reported are the within-fund abnormal return variation and standardized co-
variation (or correlation), sw
2  and ρ , respectively, averaged over funds. 
The  AR  measure averaged over shocks is insignificant for all cases at 
conventional significance levels over the estimation window. The difference in 
D  (averaged over shocks) for small and large funds is also insignificant. By 
contrast, the difference between D  for difficult-to-arbitrage funds at 13.4% and 
easy-to-arbitrage funds at 10.3% (standard error 1.12) is significant at the 5% 
level.  
The mean correlation in abnormal returns (ρ ) over all 63 funds averages 
around 17% for the eight pre-shock windows. As expected, while ρ  increases 
with fund size, the opposite is true of sw
2 , the within-fund volatility. In particular, 
the statisticρ  averaged over time is 9.8% for small funds whereas it rises 
significantly to 33.5% for large funds. By contrast, the AR volatility measure sw
2  
averaged over shocks falls from 0.96 (small funds) to 0.59 (large funds) and the 
difference, with a standard error of 0.12, is significant at the 5% level.  
The correlation of ARs across easy-to-arbitrage funds (ρ = 24.3%) is 










whereas the average volatility of ARs is significantly smaller for the former (0.82) 
than for the latter (1.13).  
 
4.2  Post-shock reaction of funds: overall pattern 
 
Table 3 reports the average (C)ARs over all funds and their t-statistics (Zt) in 
brackets.  
[Table 3 around here] 
For all negative shocks, fund prices drop significantly relative to the NAVs, 
either in day 0 or day 1. Thus for shock #1, the average discount increases by 
3.01% on day 0. For negative shocks #1, #2, and #4, this drop is reflected in AR0, 
whereas in the case of shocks #5 and #6, it is reflected in AR1. For shock #3, both 
AR0 and  AR1 are significant. There is also a significant increase in the premium 
associated with the two positive shocks with an average AR0 of 1.99%. 
The post-shock CARs provide some evidence to suggest that fund-prices 
recover relative to the NAV. However, there are clear differences in the time 
taken for this recovery ranging from one day (negative shock #2) to more than 
four weeks (negative shocks #1 and #6). In other cases, it is difficult to classify 
the pattern of ARs. For instance, for negative shock #3 there is a significant 
positive AR on day 2 suggesting that fund-prices revert back relative to the NAV 
(with the discount narrowing) but a longer-term negative drift where the 
discount continues to widen. Tests for the CAR differential at subsequent days 
for shock #3 confirm the presence of a widening discount. One-sided tests for the 
hypotheses that CAR5 is more negative than CAR0  and, likewise, that CAR0  > 
CAR15 are statistically significant with t-statistics of 3.55 and 1.69, respectively. 
The same can be concluded for positive shock #2. 
These findings clearly support the notion that fund-prices exhibit anomalpus 
behavior immediately following market-wide shocks. However, the evidence 
regarding fund-price behaviour in the 20 post-shock days is mixed. This issue is 











4.3  Do large and small funds react differently? 
 
Table 4, Panels A and B, report the (C)ARs for the funds classified by market size. 
Small funds are typically less liquid than large funds. Thus, we hypothesize that 
the fund prices of the small-funds group exhibit anomalous behaviour over 
relatively longer periods or equivalently, that the post-shock discount of the 
small funds group is more sticky than that of the large funds.  
[Table 4 around here] 
The results support the above conjecture. Following negative shocks, the CARs of 
the large funds become insignificant in a much shorter time frame than those of 
the small funds. For example, significant CARs are limited to a single day for 
large funds in the case of shocks #4 and #5 while in the case of shock #2, large 
funds do not record abnormal returns. By contrast, the mispricing lasts several 
days for small funds, particularly for shock #5 (9/11) when the discount 
continues to widen; one-sided tests for the difference between CAR0  and CAR3 
(t-stat = 2.24) and between CAR5 and CAR20 (t-stat = 1.53) reveal significant 
continuation sequences from days 1 to 3 and then days 5 to 20. These two 
patterns align with the 9/11 terrorist attack and subsequent re-opening of the US 
markets on 17th September, respectively. This anomalous mispricing pattern is 
not apparent in the large funds. A broadly similar pattern is observed for 
negative shocks #1 and #3 where the abnormal returns are more pronounced and 
typically persist for longer than those for the large funds group.  
Differences are also observed between large and small funds for the positive 
shocks. With shock #1, the anomalous fund-price behaviour is limited to 1 day 
large funds while it is reflected in the two subsequent days for small funds. In the 
case of shock #2, one-sided t-tests of the difference between CARs indicate that 
CAR5 < CAR0  (t-stat = 1.42) for small funds which is indicative of a reduction in 
the premium.6 This is followed by an increase in the premium in the subsequent 
three weeks as borne out by the test that CAR20 is significantly larger than CAR6  
                                                  










(t-stat = 1.44). By contrast, the comparable pattern for the large-funds group, 
although broadly similar, is insignificant.  
 
4.4   Does the ease of arbitrage matter? 
If the arbitrage argument holds, easy-to-arbitrage (EA) funds are less likely to be 
subject to mispricing than difficult-to-arbitrage funds (DA). The (C)ARs and t-
statistics reported in Table 5 support this conjecture.  
[Table 5 around here] 
The anomalous price movement at day 0 is generally more marked for DA funds 
and they also exhibit a longer-term widening of the discount. For instance, the 
discount of the EA funds widens by 3.92% at t=0 for negative shock #1. It 
subsequently narrows and becomes insignificantly different from the pre-shock 
level by around day 6. In contrast, the DA funds suffer a continuing widening of 
the discount from day 0 to day 4 (t-stat  CAR CAR 04 −  = 2.5) and a subsequent 
narrowing but it takes two further weeks for the CAR to become insignificant.  
Likewise, for negative shock #3, the significant anomalous fund-price 
behaviour is limited to 3 days for EA funds, whereas the discount for DA funds 
gets progressively wider during the following 20 trading days. For the remaining 
negative shocks, the EA funds either record no anomalous price reaction or, if 
they do, the widening of the discount reverts immediately to its pre-shock level. 
It turns out that the re-opening of the US market following 9/11 (day 8) does not 
cause any anomalous price movement for the EA funds whereas significant 
negative returns are noted for the DA funds.  
 
4.5  Size versus ease of arbitrage 
Having determined that fund size and ease-of-arbitrage both impact on the 
pattern of post-shock fund-price behaviour, we now attempt to shed light on 
their relative importance. In order to use the maximum possible number of funds 
in the analysis, we rank the 63 funds by size and now define the 27 funds with 










value as ‘large’. The procedure discussed in Section 3 (the Ri2 ranking from 
regressions of NAVs on stock market indexes) is applied to identify 27 funds that 
are easy-to-arbitrage (EA) and another 27 that are difficult-to-arbitrage (DA). 
There is a high degree of overlap between the small funds and the DA funds (19 
funds in common). Similarly, there is a high degree of overlap between large 
funds and EA funds (20 funds). To separate these attributes, we filter out the EA 
funds from the large funds group to obtain a large-not-EA group (7 funds) and 
likewise, we construct a small-not-DA group (8 funds).  
Summary statistics for these two new groups are given in Table 2, Panels D1 
and D2. The aforementioned overlapping helps to explain why the difference 
between the overall correlation in abnormal returns (ρ ) of 8.2% for DA funds 
and of 9.8% for small funds is insignificant. The same applies to the average 
within-fund variation in ARs (sw
2 ). Interestingly, despite the common funds, the 
difference inρ  for EA and large funds at 24.28% and 33.52%, respectively, is 
statistically significant. The difference in ρ  for the small-not-DA funds and the 
DA funds is statistically significant and the same pattern emerges for the sw
2  
statistic. For both the large-not-EA and EA funds, the overall correlation equals 
24.3% and, likewise, the overall average AR is indistinguishable for both panels; 
the difference in average sw
2  is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 1.16) at the 5% 
level. These findings are taken to suggest that the difficulty-of-arbitrage and 
smallness of funds are, in effect, different attributes whereas the ease-of-arbitrage 
and largeness appear to be more closely related. 
Table 6 reports the (C)ARs for the small-not-DA and large-not-EA samples. 
[Table 6 around here] 
Small-not-DA funds show no significant ARs at days 0 or 1 for negative shocks 
#2, #4 and #6. This contrasts with the significant anomalous fund-price 
behaviour for small funds (cf. Table 4, Panel A). For those negative shocks where 
the small-not-DA group does record abnormal negative returns at day 0 or day 1, 
the reversal of this widening of the discount is markedly quick relative to the 










the CARs for small-not-DA funds become insignificant in 6 and 9 days 
respectively, whereas for the small-funds group the CAR is still significant at day 
10 for shock #1 ( = 10 CAR -2.30%) and at day 20 for shock #3 ( = 20 CAR -4.46%). 
Interestingly also, for negative shock #5, the small-not-DA funds do not show 
negative abnormal returns when the American markets re-opened following 
9/11. This suggests that the holders of these funds were able to hedge against 
such a price movement. There is, however, no significant difference in the pattern 
of ARs for the large and large-not-EA funds. 
In sum, the difficulty-of-arbitrage appears to be a critical factor in explaining 
the sluggish post-shock reversal pattern in the discount of small-funds. The 
large-size and easy-to-arbitrage attributes are more difficult to disentangle in 
explaining the speed of reversal.  
 
4.6  The type of fund ownership 
 
We turn now our attention to the relation between the post-shock price pattern, 
the investment mandate and the shareholder profile. The shareholder profile for 
the individual funds is obtained from Computershare Analytics for the years 
1998, 2000 and 2002.7 We first focus on the earlier small- and large-sized fund 
classification. Of the 21 small funds, a total of 15 have a mandate to invest in 
small capitalisation companies. Of the 18 large funds, only 2 invest in small 
companies.  
Details of the shareholder profile are illuminating. Small funds are held 
predominantly by institutional shareholders. The institutional investors’ stake in 
the 15 small funds investing in small companies averages 71.5% while their stake 
in the other 6 small funds that invest in large companies is 48.3%.  By contrast, 
the institutional investor stake in large funds, which invest almost exclusively in 
large companies, is only 34.5%.     
The current empirical literature typically associates overreaction with the 
investing behaviour of retail investors who are thought to be more prone to 










and Thaler, 1991). More recent studies, however, suggest that institutional 
practices and frictions in the investment management industry (e.g. common 
investment strategies, herding, performance-related fund flows and career 
concerns) lead to correlated demand shocks unrelated to fundamentals which 
may be an important source of noise trading (Sias, 1996; Jackson, 2003). Our 
findings provide indirect support for this notion. In the post-shock period, it is 
the large funds group (owned principally by retail investors) that exhibits 
relatively quick discount reversal whereas the abnormal returns of the small 
funds (owned principally by institutional investors) are more persistent with less 
reversion in the discount. As noted earlier, this appears to be attributable to the 
ease of arbitrage rather than to issues related to fund-size. 
Discussions with fund managers provide a rationale for this empirical finding. 
Institutional investors use closed-end funds as an efficient way of gaining 
exposure to small companies and most of the funds investing in small companies 
are themselves characterised by small capitalisation. Institutional investors who 
w i s h  t o  i n v e s t  i n  l a r g e  m a r k e t - c a p  s t o c k s  b u y  s h a r e s  d i r e c t l y  a n d  d o  n o t  u s e  
closed-end funds for that purpose On the other hand, retail investors choose 
large funds as an easy way of obtaining broad geographic and industry 
diversification. The evidence here suggests that it is not the type of investing 
behaviour associated with a particular group of investors that determines the 
speed of reversal. The ‘cost’ for the institutional investors of gaining exposure to 
the small-cap sector via closed-end funds is that they end up holding securities 
that are more difficult to arbitrage.   
       
4.7   Shocks and long-term changes in the discount 
 
Table 7 shows the average discount computed over pre- and post-shock windows 
of 50 days each alongside the t-statistics for the difference. 
[Table 7 around here] 
For all 63 funds, the average post-shock discount significantly widens by around 
0.76% for negative shocks and significantly narrows for positive shocks by 0.67%. 
                                                                                                                                   










This evidence confirms that fund prices overreact relative to NAVs following 
salient events.8 
When the funds are categorised by size, the sluggish post-shock reversal 
phase noted above for the small funds continues during 3 months with the 
discount widening by around 1.5% following negative shocks. The discount does 
not change significantly following positive shocks. For large funds, in contrast, 
the discount does not change significantly after negative shocks, although it does 
narrow significantly following positive shocks. A further interesting finding is 
that the sluggish (or lack of) reversal in the case of small funds, predominantly 
held by institutional investors, is apparent for negative but not for positive 
shocks while the opposite holds for large funds. In the light of the fact that 
institutional and retail investors have a preference for small and large funds, 
respectively, this contrasting response to positive/negative shocks provides 
some evidence of an asymmetry in the behaviour of retail and institutional 
investors, notwithstanding the small numbe r  o f  p o s i t i v e  s h o c k s  ( t w o )  i n  o u r  
sample. 
Dividing the sample on the basis of arbitrage considerations provides strong 
support for the notion that it is the ease of arbitrage that brings the discount back 
to pre-shock levels. The long term discount for the easy-to-arbitrage group 
narrows marginally by 0.29% following negative shocks while the discount for 
difficult-to-arbitrage funds significantly widens after negative shocks by around 
2%.  
When the difficult-to-arbitrage funds are filtered out from the group of small 
funds, the widening of the discount post-negative-shock is now 0.45% only (c.f. a 
widening of 1.5% for the small funds group). The opposite is true for positive 
shocks; the narrowing of the discount is more marked in the small fund group 
than in the small-not-difficult-arbitrage group. This further corroborates the 
                                                  
8 We assess the contention in Burch et al. (2003) that, following market-wide shocks, the discount 
and the broader market move closely. We replicate their methodology using the the FTSE All Share 
index level relative to its pre-shock level, (FTt-FT-1)/FT-1, t=0,1,…,20. The coefficient from 
regressing the mean discount over the 8 shocks against the mean relative movement in the FTSE is 










notion that the key factor behind the anomalous fund-price behaviour following 
large shocks is the ease of arbitrage rather than fund size. 
 
5  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results to four factors: the 
length of the estimation window, the bid-ask spread, the choice of index to 
measure ease-of-arbitrage and the impact of financial leverage.9 
 
5.1 Estimation window 
We assess the significance of the reported CARs using a estimation window 
closer to the event date. We choose (-50,-1) in recomputing (1) rather than (-60,-
11). The standard errors are slightly larger but the results are not affected 
qualitatively since essentially the same CARs are significant. 
 
5.2  Bid-ask effects 
It is possible that the bid-ask spread for the fund widens after the shock and this 
may be what hinders arbitrage. To investigate this conjecture, we collect data on 
bid-ask prices for the individual funds. The spread (S) is computed as the ratio of 
(ask-bid)/mid-price. Table 8 reports, for each jump, pairwise tests of the difference 
in the average spread over two time periods straddling the shock.  
[Table 8 around here] 
We compute the average spread over the pre-shock windows [-20,-11] and [-10,-
1] and over the post-shock windows [1,10] and [11,20] for each fund. We test the 
hypothesis that  H0:  SS [,] [ , ] −− = 20 11 11 20  on the one hand, and  H0:  SS [, ] [ , ] −−= 10 1 1 10  
on the other.10 It turns out the statistics are uniformly significant at even the 10% 
                                                  
9 We also compute the t-statistics on the basis of standard errors (s.e.) from the variance estimator 
(1). Unsurprisingly, a comparison of these s.e. with those used in Table 3 indicates that the former 
are downward biased by a factor of above 3 on average thus leading to a larger number of 
significant CARs. 
10The ask (or bid) price is not available for some funds over specific periods. The tests are based on 
the maximum number of funds possible for each jump; this is 46 for negative jump #1 and positive 










level with two exceptions. This suggests that the changes in the bid-ask spread 
are not driving the anomalous pattern of fund prices 
 
5.3   Stock index and easy- versus difficult-to-arbitrage classification 
To investigate the sensitivity of the earlier easy-to-arbitrage (EA) versus difficult-
to-arbitrage (DA) classification to the stock index used in the regressions, we 
repeat the analysis using the FTSE100 for all funds. We thus seek to account for 
the possibility that the funds co-move with their host index (the index of the 
country where they are traded) rather than with the index of the country where 
the underlying assets are located. The resulting Ri2 ranking gives a new EA group 
(top quartile) which has eight funds in common with the earlier group. However, 
eight funds previously classified as easy-to-arbitrage are now classified as either 
difficult-to-arbitrage (2 Far East funds) or fall in the two mid quartiles (4 US 
funds and 2 UK funds). All of eight new funds now classified as easy-to-arbitrage 
have US mandates. Regarding the new DA group, it shares eleven funds with the 
earlier counterpart. However, five funds (all UK mandates) move out and fall in 
the mid quartiles and all five new funds entering the DA category have Far East 
mandates. 
Although there are some changes in the group members for the new EA and 
DA categories relative to those discussed in Section 3.2, the inference does not 
change qualitatively. If anything, the contrasting post-shock abnormal return 
pattern in the two groups is now more distinct.  
 
5.4 Leverage effects 
 
Closed-end funds are able to lever up and thus the impact of an NAV change on 
the fund price could be magnified by the existence of large fund leverage. For the 
current sample of funds, the typical level of leverage is modest ⎯ the average 
level of gearing measured as D/E (where D is debt and E is equity) is 7% in 1991, 
10% in 1998, and 9% in 2001 and 2002.  
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so that the AR for D/E>0 is smaller than that for D/E=0. It turns out that while 
the significance of the t-statistics declines, the decline in all instances is very 
marginal. For example, for negative shock #1, the ARs for the complete sample 
are now significantly negative until day 5 rather than day 6. The patterns of the 
(unreported) ARs incorporating leverage are very similar to the original results 
for all sub-samples.11    
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper reports anomalous closed-end fund-price behaviour in response to 
market-wide shocks. The evidence is based on a sample of 63 closed-end funds 
traded continuously on the London Stock Exchange from January 1988 to 
December 2003. 
Fund prices overreact to changes in the net asset value following market-wide 
shocks. This overreaction either on the day of the shock or on the following 
trading day for all eight large shocks identified in the sample. Overall, there is 
some weak evidence that in the [0,+20] post-negative-shock window, the 
discount shows some tendency to revert following an initial widening at the time 
of the shock.  
For the 20-day windows following shocks, we find that ease of arbitrage (or 
replication using stock market indexes) to be an important factor in explaining 
the post-shock pattern of fund prices relative to the net asset values. The 
discounts of those funds that are easy to arbitrage, while widening at the time of 
a negative shock, revert quickly to pre-shock levels. The ease-of-arbitrage would 
appear to be a more important consideration in bringing fund-prices back in line 
with NAVs than factors related to fund size. This is particularly marked for 
funds that are small. Large fund-size appears to be intrinsically linked to the 
ease-to-arbitrage.  
                                                  










In comparing the average discounts over a 50-day pre- and post-shock 
window, we find a pattern confirming our conjecture that it is the ease-of-
arbitrage that  drives the speed of reversal. Following negative shocks, the 
discount of the easy-to-arbitrage group narrows by 29 basis points while that of 
the group of small funds widens by 148 basis points. However, the discount for 
the small-but-not-difficult-to-arbitrage group widens by only 45 basis points.   
These findings confirm the importance of arbitrage in determining the level of 
the discount  (Pontiff, 1996)  
Further investigation into the shareholder profile suggests that the small 
funds (that predominantly invest in small companies) are mostly held by 
institutional shareholders whereas large funds tend to be held by retail investors. 
It would appear to be the case that institutional investors use (small) funds as a 
means of gaining exposure to the small capitalisation sector. The cost of gaining 
this exposure to the small capitalisation sector is that institutional investors end 










APPENDIX I.  Description of shocks 
Negative shock #1  (16/10/89) 
Monday sell-off in London (daily return –4.06% on FTSE All Share index) following 
Wall Street falls the previous Friday (-6.12% daily return S&P 500). The Financial Times  
(FT, 14 Oct) reported that “the BoE sees no reason for last’s night dramatic fall on Wall 
Street to be repeated on the London equity market …” given “that London shares are 
not underpinned by leveraged situations to the same degree as US share prices” and 
that “…a large number of lessons were learned about policy and supervisory issues 
during the market crash of 1987”. 
 
Positive shock #1  (08/10/90) 
Response to announcement regarding entry to ERM byt the FT cautions cautions that 
ERM entry is a predominantly domestic affair and that nothing has changed 
regarding the build-up in the Gulf and the international banking crisis.  
 
Negative shock #2  (19/08/91) 
Coup in Russia. FT reported that it was unclear what the direct external economic 
consequences would be but suggested that “… the further implosion of the Soviet 
economy should have little direct effect on corporate earnings” (20 Aug).  
 
Positive shock #2  (10/04/92) 
Conservatives win the election and a fourth term in office.  
 
Negative shock #3  (27/08/98) 
“Economic and financial crises gripping Russia (sovereign default) sparked the sell-off 
on world stock markets” made worse by “a picture of relentless gloom in (UK) 
manufacturing” (FT, 28 Aug). 
 
Negative shock #4  (22/03/01) 
“A rash of profits warnings and another weak start on Wall Street combined to 
depress sentiment” (FT, 22 Mar). The bad news is concentrated in the manufacturing 
and technology sectors but is mitigated by strong sales growth in the consumer sector.    
 
Negative shock #5 (11/09/01) 
Terrorist attacks in New York 
 
Negative shock #6  (03/07/02) 
Rumours about accounting irregularities at Vodafone (which dropped 6%) and 
WorldCom. The Treasury noted that “no country can insulate itself from the ups and 
downs in world financial markets but … the (UK) economy is better placed that it has 
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